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Abstract
We illustrate, by means of two examples, why assuming the principals o⁄er simple menus (i.e.
collections of payo⁄-relevant alternatives) as opposed to more general mechanisms may preclude
a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes in certain sequential contracting
environments. We then discuss how re￿nements of the solution concept, or enrichments of the
menus that allow for recommendations, may restore the possibility of using menus to obtain a
complete equilibrium characterization.
JEL Classi￿cation Numbers: D89, C72.
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1 Introduction
When multiple principals contract simultaneously with the same agent, Peters (2001) and Marti-
mort and Stole (2002) have proved the following result: For any equilibrium relative to any game
with arbitrary sets of mechanisms for the principals, there exists an equilibrium in the game in
which the principals are restricted to o⁄er the agent the menus of payo⁄-relevant alternatives they
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1could have o⁄ered in the original game that sustains the same outcomes. This result is referred
to in the literature as the Delegation Principle (or the Menu Theorem) and has proved useful in
applications.
Recent years have witnessed interest in environments in which contracting is sequential, in the
sense that the agent contracts with his multiple principals at di⁄erent points in time.1 In light of
this fast growing literature, it is important to understand whether restricting the principals to o⁄er
menus of payo⁄-relevant alternatives, as opposed to more general mechanisms, is without loss of
generality also when contracting is sequential.
In this note we construct two examples that illustrate why simple menus may fail to sustain
all equilibrium outcomes in certain sequential contracting environments.
The ￿rst example features a situation in which the principals observe the payo⁄-relevant de-
cisions taken upstream, but not necessarily the mechanisms used to select them. In this setting,
restricting the principals to o⁄er menus may mean restricting the extent to which di⁄erent principals
can have diverging beliefs about the speci￿c mechanism used upstream to select an o⁄-equilibrium
decision. When the agent￿ s strategy is not Markov (i.e. it may depend on the entire upstream his-
tory), this means imposing restrictions on the principals￿expectations about the agent￿ s behavior
downstream. Such restrictions may preclude the possibility of sustaining certain outcomes.
The second example features a situation in which all principals observe both the mechanisms
and the payo⁄-relevant decisions selected upstream. The reason why simple menus fail in this
example is that they do not permit the principals to use payo⁄-irrelevant information as a device
to correlate their decisions. In the absence of alternative instruments such as sunspots or cheap
talk messages, this means restricting the possible outcomes.
These examples warn against the use of simple menus in certain sequential contracting environ-
ments. However, there are situations of interest for applications in which the problems indicated
by these examples never arise. Furthermore, there are ways of enriching the menus (for example
allowing the principals to send each other, and/or the agent, recommendations about the decisions
to take downstream) that may restore the possibility of using menus to sustain all equilibrium
outcomes. We discuss some of these issues at the end of the note.
1We refer the reader to Pavan and Calzolari (2007) for a discussion of the relevance of sequential contracting in
applications.
22 Simple menus
This section contains two examples that illustrate why simple menus may not sustain all equilibrium
outcomes when contracting is sequential.
2.1 Out-of-equilibrium beliefs
Consider a game in which four principals contract sequentially with the same agent, A. The game
has four stages. At each stage, a di⁄erent principal, Pi; i = 1;:::;4; contracts with A: Each principal
must select a payo⁄-relevant alternative ai (also referred to as a decision) from a set Ai of feasible
alternatives. Depending on the application of interest, ai can be a policy, a level of trade, or the
decision to undertake a project.
The selection of ai is obtained through a mechanism; the latter consists of a set of possible
messages Mi along with a mapping ￿i : Mi ! Ai such that, when A sends the message mi 2 Mi,
Pi responds by selecting the alternative ai 2 Ai:
In this example, the sets of feasible alternatives are Ai = fbi;cig; for i = 1;:::;3; and A4 =
fd;e;fg: The principals￿and the agent￿ s payo⁄s are described by the quintuples (u1;u2;u3;u4;uA)
in Figure 1; note that, when all players￿payo⁄s are independent of the decisions taken after period
t = 1;:::;3; the tree has been cut to highlight directly the ￿nal payo⁄s.
Before choosing her mechanism, each downstream principal observes all the payo⁄-relevant
decisions taken upstream. Furthermore each downstream principal observes all upstream mecha-
nisms, with the exception of the mechanism selected by P1: None of the principals observes the
messages sent by the agent to the other principals.
Now consider the game ￿ in which the sets of feasible mechanisms are ￿1 = f￿
b1
1 ;￿c1
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Superscripts denote the image (i.e. the range) of the mechanism; for example, Im(￿
d;e
i ) = fd;eg:
Note that, for any i 6= 1; and any menu of payo⁄-relevant alternatives  i 2 2Ainf?g there exists
one and only one mechanism ￿
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equilibrium. It su¢ ces to take any strategy pro￿le with the following properties: P1 o⁄ers the
mechanism ￿
b1
1 ; regardless of a1, P2 o⁄ers ￿
b2
2 ; regardless of (a1;a2;￿2); P3 o⁄ers ￿
b3
3 ; regardless of
(￿2;￿3); P4 o⁄ers ￿
d;e;f
4 if (a1;a2;a3) = (c1;b2;b3) and ￿d
4 otherwise; at t = 1; A chooses c1 if P1
o⁄ers ￿
b1;c1
1 ; at t = 2, A chooses c2 if P2 o⁄ers ￿
b2;c2
2 ; at t = 3, A chooses c3 if P3 o⁄ers ￿
b3;c3
3 ; at
t = 4, when o⁄ered the mechanism ￿
d;e;f
4 ; A chooses e if ￿1 = ￿c1
1 ; f if ￿1 = ￿ ￿
c1
1 and d if either
￿1 = ￿
b1
1 or ￿1 = ￿
b1;c1
1 : Clearly, this is only a partial description of the strategy pro￿le; however,
such a description contains all information that is relevant for the result we want to establish.
The aforementioned strategy pro￿le is sustained by the following out-of-equilibrium beliefs: after
observing c1, P2 believes that ￿1 = ￿ ￿
c1
1 ; P3 believes that ￿1 = ￿
b1;c1
1 , and P4 believes that ￿1 = ￿c1
1 :
We claim that the outcome (b1;b2;b3;d) cannot be sustained in the "menu game" ￿M in which
the principals are restricted to o⁄er the menus of payo⁄-relevant alternatives they could have o⁄ered
in ￿ and delegate to the agent the choice of the decisions. We prove the result by showing that this
outcome requires that, after observing a deviation to c1; the supports of P2￿ s, P3￿ s, and P4￿ s beliefs
about the mechanism used by P1 not overlap, which clearly cannot be the case in ￿M.
To see this, note that P1 (weakly) prefers b1 to c1 if and only if c1 is followed by b2 and b3:
Hence, for (b1;b2;b3;d) to be an equilibrium outcome in ￿M; it must be that, after observing a
deviation to c1; P2 and P3 o⁄er menus that contain, respectively, b2 and b3, and that A selects b2
and b3 in each of these menus. Furthermore, because A strictly prefers c2 to b2 after c1 and strictly
4prefers c3 to b3 after (c1;b2); it must be that P2 o⁄ers the (degenerate) menu fb2g after observing
c1 and that P3 o⁄ers the (degenerate) menu fb3g after observing the menu fb2g and the decisions
(c1;b2): Because P2 can always guarantee herself a payo⁄ of 2 by choosing c2 after c1; for her to
o⁄er the menu fb2g it must be that she expects A to choose b3 with P3 and f with P4: Similarly,
because P3 can always guarantee herself a payo⁄ of 2 by choosing c3 after (c1;b2), for her to o⁄er
the menu fb3g it must be that she expects A to choose d with P4: Lastly, because P4 can always
guarantee herself a payo⁄ of 2 by choosing e after (c1;b2;b3); for her to o⁄er any other menu, it
must be that this menu contains e and that she expects A to choose e from the menu.
We conclude that any strategy pro￿le that sustains (b1;b2;b3;d) as an equilibrium in ￿M must
satisfy the following properties: P2 o⁄ers the menu fb2g after observing c1; P3 o⁄ers the menu fb3g
after observing the menu fb2g and the decisions (c1;b2); P4 o⁄ers the menu fe;f;gg after observing
the menus fb2g and fb3g and the decisions (c1;b2;b3).
Now, given the decisions (c1;b2;b3) and the upstream menus fb2g and fb3g; the agent￿ s behavior
at t = 4 may vary only on the basis of the particular menu containing c1 o⁄ered at t = 1. Because
in ￿M there are only two such menus, there are only two possible behavioral strategies that A can
follow at t = 4 given the decisions (c1;b2;b3) and the menus fb2g and fb3g. It is thus impossible
that P2, P3 and P4 expect A to choose respectively f; d; and e with probability one when o⁄ered
the menu fe;f;gg: The outcome (b1;b2;b3;d) can thus be sustained in ￿ but not in the "menu
game" ￿M.
2.2 Correlation devices
We now illustrate a second reason why menus may not sustain all possible outcomes. Consider
an environment in which three principals contract sequentially with the same agent. The sets
of feasible alternatives are A1 = ftg and A2 = A3 = [0;1]: For simplicity, assume P1￿ s and
P3￿ s payo⁄s are constant over A ￿ A1 ￿ A2 ￿ A3, whereas P2￿ s and A￿ s payo⁄s are respectively
u2 = 2a2a3 + (1 ￿ a2)(1 ￿ a3) and uA = a3(1 + a2). In this environment, all principals observe all
mechanisms selected upstream. Whether they also observe the payo⁄-relevant decisions taken in
these mechanisms is not important in this example but, to ￿x ideas, assume they do.
Now consider a game ￿ in which the sets of feasible mechanisms are ￿1 = f￿ ￿1;￿
1g and ￿i =
f￿
ai
i gai2Ai; i = 2;3; where ￿
ai
i is a mechanism such that Im(￿
ai
i ) = ai:
5The following is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in ￿: P1 randomizes over ￿ ￿1 and ￿
1 with
probability q 2 (0;1) and 1 ￿ q, respectively; given ￿ ￿1, P2 chooses a2 = 1; whereas given ￿
1 she
chooses a2 = 0; at t = 3; regardless of (￿2;a2); P3 chooses a3 = 1 if ￿1 = ￿ ￿1 and a3 = 0 if ￿1 = ￿
1.
The equilibrium outcome is (t;1;1) with probability q and (t;0;0) with probability 1 ￿ q: This
outcome cannot be sustained in the "menu game" ￿M in which the principals o⁄er the menus of
payo⁄-relevant alternatives they could have o⁄ered in ￿ and delegate to the agent the choice of the
decisions. The reason is that ￿M does not permit P1 to correlate the other principals￿decisions.
The role of P1 as a correlation device is key to sustain the outcome described above and cannot
be replicated by P2. In fact, P2 ￿nds it optimal to match the decision taken by P3￿ and hence to
respond to the mechanism selected by P1 anticipating how P3 responds to it￿ but is never willing
to mix over A2, for she strictly prefers (a2;a3) = (1;1) to (a2;a3) = (0;0):
3 Discussion
The equilibrium constructed in the ￿rst example is a (weak) perfect Bayesian equilibrium but
neither a sequential nor a Markov-perfect equilibrium. Imposing such re￿nements may restore
the possibility of using menus to sustain all outcomes. In this respect, the example highlights
an important di⁄erence between simultaneous and sequential common agency. In the former, the
validity of the Delegation Principle is independent of whether one is interested in all perfect Bayesian
equilibrium outcomes or only in outcomes that can be sustained by imposing re￿nements such as
sequential or Markov-perfect equilibrium. This is not the case in the latter.
Next, consider the second example. If public sunspots are available, then restricting the prin-
cipals to o⁄er simple menus may not pose any problem. The role of the example is to warn
against the use of simple menus in environments in which alternative correlation devices are not
available￿ another important di⁄erence with respect to the simultaneous case.
Also note that the notion of menus considered here is the one used in applications: a menu is
a collection of payo⁄-relevant alternatives.2 The problems highlighted by our examples vanish if
one considers more general menus that allow the principals to send each other, and/or the agent,
recommendations about the decisions to take downstream. For instance, in the ￿rst example,
2This is also the notion used by Martimort and Stole (2002) to establish the Delegation Principle.
6the two mechanisms  
1 = fc1g and ￿  1 = fc1g can be replaced by two menus that contain the
same payo⁄-relevant decision but two di⁄erent recommendations to the agent about the strategy to
follow downstream. Provided that these recommendations are private (in the sense that they are
not observed by the downstream principals), then the outcome (b1;b2;b3;d) can be sustained also
in the menu game with recommendations.3 Similarly, the outcome in the second example can be
sustained by letting the ￿rst principal send public (perfectly correlated) recommendations to the
downstream principals.
These enriched menus are more similar to Myerson (1982) generalized direct revelation mech-
anisms than to simple menus such as price-quantity schedules, as typically used in applications.
As shown in Peters (2001), allowing for such enriched menus may be necessary when the agent
exerts some e⁄ort after communicating with the principals. In Peters￿environment, contracting
is simultaneous and recommendations are used to fashion the agent￿ s beliefs about the principal￿ s
response to the agent￿ s e⁄ort. Because this is the only role that recommendations play in simul-
taneous games, such recommendations can be dispensed with if one allows the principals to o⁄er
menus of lotteries over contracts (as opposed to menus of deterministic decisions).4 The role of
recommendations in sequential contracting is di⁄erent: in the ￿rst example, recommendations are
used to permit the downstream principals to have diverging beliefs about the agent￿ s behavior
in downstream relationships. In the second example, recommendations are used to correlate the
principals￿decisions. Furthermore, it may not su¢ ce to introduce lotteries to dispense with such
recommendations, as it can be seen by considering the second example where there is a single such
lottery.
While our examples warn against the use of simple menus in certain environments, there are
situations in which simple menus do sustain all equilibrium outcomes. As shown in Pavan and
Calzolari (2007), this is always the case when contracting is private, i.e. when downstream principals
observe neither the mechanisms nor the payo⁄-relevant decisions selected upstream. Furthermore,
even when contracting is not private, all equilibrium outcomes sustained by Markov strategies can
be sustained with simple menus. Because Markov strategies are often considered a focal class,
3We thank a referee for suggesting this possibility.
4In a moral hazard setting, a decision should be interpreted as a contract that speci￿es the principal￿ s action as
a function of some veri￿able performance measure correlated with the agent￿ s e⁄ort.
7simple menus may retain a signi￿cant appeal in many applications, even if they do not sustain all
equilibrium outcomes.
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